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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.
Whether the district court abused its discretion and erred as a
matter of law when it denied Plaintiffs petition for attorneys5 fees
under the private attorney general doctrine, ruling that the doctrine
does not apply unless a plaintiff can show: (A) creation of a substantial
pecuniary or nonpecuniary benefit; or (B) the actions of county officers
show bias or are undertaken in bad faith.
In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994),
this Court made the private attorney general doctrine applicable in Utah "when the
'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the
necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an
extent requiring subsidization,'" (citing Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal.
1977)). On appeal, "the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney
fees is abuse of discretion." Hughes v. Caffertv. 89 P.3d 148, 152 (Utah 2004).
Here, however, the district court erred as a matter of law by misinterpreting the
legal requirements of the private attorney general doctrine as articulated by this Court in
the Stewart decision and by grafting onto that doctrine two additional requirements which
this Court did not require in Stewart, to wit: (1) conferral of a substantial pecuniary or
nonpecuniary benefit; or (2) a showing of bias or bad faith on the part of public officers.
Because this Court reviews questions of law under a correction of error standard, the trial
court's determination of the legal standards to be applied should be reviewed without
l

deference. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. 1'iaden Mlu. (Juu>., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is
tlust nun IIIIUMINI r il„u district court's characterization of its conclusions of law as
"findings of fact," and they are reviewed for correctness. Gilmore v. Wright., K s i 11
431 (Utah 1993).
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whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiffs attorneys' fees
under the private attorney general doctrine by ignoring and negating its own
previous findings and conclusions on the merits of the case which still bound
the court.
In ruling on the merits of Plaintu
the moti

* the district court not only granted

i injunction barring the Defendant from placing an illegal

"initiative" petition on the 2002 ballot, but also found and concluded that: ( \ i U i*M»rs
presented by Plaintiff are of great importance t

M) the lawsuit raised

important and unique issues \ mi; nnui)' (IK rightof the people to legislate directly; (C) to
all, A\ 11h<* unlawful initiative] petition to be placed on the ballot would effectively render
the referenda provisions of the Utah Constitution and the Uial™ < • "K meaningless; (D)
allowing the [unlawful initiative] petiu

would permit the sponsors to

misuse line peopled direct legislative power to thwart the will of the majority of Davis
County voters; and (E) Davis County voters have a real and substantial ink i» ( fit
ensuring that the laws of initiative and idi/ninLt n,> i \w upulously followed and the
electionprocey ,nllni", I'MIJ

"Icollaw.

Each of the findings and conclusions listed above was recited by the district
in its Ruling on the merits of the case in chief issued f »> It -I >», i i > '* •< • " i )i- \ were all
again incorporated by reference i /. • I . * h] 111 ( '*ni»-1 s first Order on attorneys5 fees filed
2

on October 3, 2003 and again in its smmil IVI'i, im landiim Decision and Order on
attorneys

^

i /, 2006. These findings and conclusions underscore

ih i" public importance of the results achieved by the Plaintiff in its success I til lit ip.'i lion
below. Collectively, they describe the plaintiff'. |uiliri?il union,- ns the very kind of
"vindication i >l ' 11) » so

important public policy" which is at the core of the

Stew at f decision regarding the public attorney general doctrine.
It is only when Plaintiff requested to have its attorneys1 fees |ui'h inder the private
attorney general doctrine, sh/ii sii-. i\w\rw\ , nmi, suddenly and inexplicably, can find
nothing

whatsoever in Plaintiffs litigation. In denying Plaintiffs attorneys'

fees, the district court now concludes that, "This Court cannot e
concrete benefits created in this

Respectfully, Plaintiff argues that the

:)

district i IHII " li v. miMimNpreted and misapplied the legal standard for the private attorney
general doctrine as set out by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart and us pu^yny
This Court reviews questions of law undei
trial court's determinatii

fandard, and the

^ndards to be applied should be reviewed without

(ieferem, c Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002). Nor is
this Court bound by the district court's characterization
"findings of fact,'" and they aic irvirnT.) i » ,',iir«viiif v, Gilmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE - PROCEDURAL POSTURE
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying attorneys' fees to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff prevailed on the merits of the underlying litigation in which the
district court ruled in favor of Plaintiff on all issues. In its Ruling, dated October 15,
2002, the district court granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction, holding that an antifluoride "initiative petition" which sought to have Davis County voters "re-vote" on the
question offluoridationwas, in fact, an illegal and untimely referendum, and
permanently enjoining the Davis County Clerk from placing the anti-fluoride "initiative"
on the 2002 general election ballot. (Addendum Tab 1.)
Although the district court held for Plaintiff on all issues in the case in chief, it
nevertheless subsequently denied, on October 3, 2003, Plaintiffs motion for attorneys'
fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine of Stewart. (Addendum Tab 2.)
Plaintiff timely appealed the denial of its attorneys' fees and costs to the Supreme Court.
The appeal was assigned to and heard by the Court of Appeals, which ruled on August
11, 2005 that the district court'sfindingsand conclusions on the fee question were
insufficient, and remanded the case to the district court for additional findings and
conclusions adequate to justify its decision. (Addendum Tab 3.) On February 17, 2006
(having conducted no further proceedings), the district court issued its Memorandum
Decision and Order setting out its reasons for denying Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs
(Addendum Tab 4), and specifically stating that its Memorandum Decision was intended
to supplant and replace its earlier decision on the fee issue (Findings of Fact, Conclusions
4

of Law, and Order, dated October 3, 2003). Plaintiff timely appealed - for the second
time - the district court's denial of its attorneys' fees, and the Supreme Court retained
this appeal on its docket by letter dated April 24, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE - FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Where all of the taxpayer-funded resources of a county are arrayed to promote and
defend an unconstitutional and unlawful initiative to overturn a vote of the people,
leaving no one to defend or advocate the rule of law and the rights of a majority of voters
except private plaintiffs, does the private attorney general doctrine justify an award of
attorneys' fees to a plaintiff who successfully vindicates the people's constitutional and
statutory right to have the laws of initiative and referenda scrupulously enforced?
Plaintiff, Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc., is a small non-profit
corporation organized specifically to advocate for the public health benefits of
fluoridation. The organization consists of about 30 private citizens who volunteer their
time. One of their projects was to place an initiative on the 2000 general election ballot
which, if approved by the voters, would require the 18 public water districts in Davis
County to fluoridate their water. (R. at 101-8.) (Addendum Tab 5.)
In the general election of 2000, a majority of voters in Davis County approved the
initiative to require fluoridation. Of the total 85,353 citizens who voted, 44,403 voted in
favor and 40,950 voted against, resulting in a 52% to 48% outcome. (R. at 277).
As mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(2), following the affirmative vote on
the ballot, on April 5, 2001, the Davis County Health Department ordered all 18
5

operators of public water systems in Davis County to addfluorideon or before May 1,
2002. (R. at 277.)
Notwithstanding the 2000 election outcome, opponents offluoridein Davis
County pressed on. David Hansen was the principal sponsor of a document he called an
"initiative petition" which was formally titled "Revote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act".
By its own terms, this "initiative petition" requested: (A) a "Repeal of prior action"; (B)
that a re-vote onfluoridationbe held; and (C) that county voters again be asked the
question (in language identical to the 2000 ballot question), "Shouldfluoridebe added to
the public water supplies within Davis County?" (R. at 806, EX 10.)1 (Addendum Tab
9.)
On May 1, 2001 — before and without even receiving an application to circulate
the anti-fluoride "petition" — the County Clerk, Steve Rawlings, sent an e-mail to David
Hansen saying that the petition could be placed on the 2002 ballot if the sponsors
submitted the necessary signatures prior to the filing deadline. (R. at 806, EX 9.) Seven
days after receiving Rawlings' e-mail, David Hansen and the other petition sponsors filed
with Defendant Steve Rawlings their application to circulate their "initiative petition" to
re-vote fluoridation. Importantly, Steve Rawlings made no analysis of the legality of this
anti-fluoride "initiative petition" before he approved it for circulation. (R. at 874-99.)
Nor did the County Attorney. (R. at 874-159, 160.)
1

The "petition" itself also made four unsubstantiated and highly inflammatory
"findings of fact" about thefluoridationvote. These "findings" claimed that fluoride is a
health hazard, that its risks had been kept hidden, thatfluoridationis unconstitutional, and
that the cost is astronomical. (R. at 806, EX 10, p.4) (Addendum Tab 9.)
6

The anti-fluoride "petition" circulated for over a year collecting signatures. At the
Davis County Republican Convention in May 2002, the Davis County Clerk (Steve
Rawlings), the Davis County Commission Chairman (Dan McConkie) and the County
Attorney (Mel Wilson) all signed it. (R. at 874-64, 65; R. at 768.)
The sponsors of the anti-fluoride "petition"finishedfilingtheir completed
signature sheets with Defendant Steve Rawlings on July 8, 2002 (R. at 874-69.)
(Addendum Tab 9.) The signatures were all verified by July 8, 2002 and the very next
day, Steve Rawlings certified the anti-fluoride "petition" as an "Initiative Petition" and,
by letter dated July 9, 2002, delivered it to the County Commission for its action (R. at
806, EX 12). (Addendum Tab 10.) He testified that he made no analysis at all of
whether the petition was actually an initiative or a referendum prior to sending it to the
County Commission. (R. 874-99.) The Deputy County Attorney responsible for the
petition, Gerald Hess, also testified that he did not vet the anti-fluoride "petition" for
legality before it was sent to the full Commission. (R. at 874-159, 160.)
The Davis County Commission met on July 9, 2002, and the minutes of that
meeting state that the "Certification for the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory
Fluoridation Act" was "presented," and "the recommendation of the Commission is to
forward the information to the Davis County Attorney Office for review and preparation
of legal opinion to be given to the Commission on or before the next meeting of August
6, 2002." (R. at 806, EX 13.) (Addendum Tab 11.)

7

On July 29, 2002, Plaintiffs volunteer counsel, David Irvine, sent a letter to the
Davis County Attorney, setting out his legal analysis that the anti-fluoride "petition" was,
in fact, unlawful because its sponsors' only recourse for a "re-vote" was through
referendum, and the time for filing a referendum petition had long-since passed. (R. at
806, EX 11.) Mr. Hess sent a copy of Mr. Irvine's letter to Steve Rawlings. (R. at 847106, 107.)
Mr. Irvine's letter sufficiently alarmed Steve Rawlings so that he did two very
unusual things. First, on August 1, 2002, even though he hadn't worried about the
legality of the anti-fluoride petition when it was presented to him on July, 8, 2002, Steve
Rawlings now sent his own recommendation to Gerald Hess stating that after studying it,
he had determined that if the anti-fluoride "petition" was not an actually a legal initiative
(even though "the petition filed does have the heading "Initiative Petition"), "the petition
could be constructively construed as having the intent of a 'Referendum Petition'", and
he urged Mr. Hess to "consider" this alternative construction in rendering his legal
opinion to the County Commission (R. at 806, EX 11.) (Addendum Tab 12.) Second,
when Mr. Hess did not respond to him within 4 days, Steve Rawlings requested a legal
opinion from his son, Troy, about the legality of the anti-fluoride "petition." (R at 87474.) Troy Rawlings was a deputy prosecutor in the Davis County Attorney's Office, and
he had also signed the anti-fluoride "petition." (R. at 874-72.)
On August 5, 2002, Troy Rawlings gave his father a legal opinion that the antifluoride "petition" was, in fact, a "timely filed referendum." (R. at 874-80.) He later
8

recanted this opinion in February, 2003, when he testified that his conclusion was
invalidated by a Utah Supreme Court decision, Tobias v. City of South Jordan, 972 P.2d
353 (Utah 1998), which he had failed to find in his research. (R. at 874-86, 87.) For his
part, after July 29, 2002, Mr. Hess concluded that the anti-fluoride "petition" was a
lawful initiative, and informed the Commission of his legal conclusion when it met on
August 6, 2002. (R. at 806, EX 1.) (Addendum Tab 13.)
Mr. Irvine attended the County Commission meeting on August 6, 2002 and asked
to speak in rebuttal to Mr. Hess's opinion that the anti-fluoride "petition" was a lawful
initiative. The County Chairman, Mr. McConkie, refused to allow Mr. Irvine to be heard
in opposition, and indeed, he refused to allow any comment at all from the audience. (R.
at 874-156.) The Commission decided to take no action regarding the anti-fluoride
"initiative petition," which, under the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-501(3)(d)(ii),
meant that the "initiative petition" would be placed on the 2002 general election ballot
automatically. (Addendum Tab 17.)
On August 15, 2002, Plaintiff Utahns for Better Dental Health-Utah, Inc. filed a
lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the anti-fluoride "petition" was actually an
illegal and untimely referendum, and also seeking an injunction barring the Davis County
Clerk from placing the illegal petition on the ballot. (R. at 1.)
Following a hearing on September 13, 2002, the district court issued a verbal order
granting the injunction sought by Plaintiff. (R. at 148.) Reducing its verbal order to a
formal Ruling on October 15, 2002, the district court decided in Plaintiffs favor on all
9

causes of action, granted a permanent injunction, and reserved the question of PlaintifFs
attorneys' fees for later consideration. In its formal Ruling on the merits of the case in
chief, the district court held that:
This lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right of the
people to legislate directly. Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides
for the people of the State of Utah to exercise their direct legislative power
through initiatives and referenda. "Article VI, section 1 is not merely a grant of
the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees the initiative power to
the people." Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89,fl23,
P.3d
(citations
omitted). . . . "Because the people's right to directly legislate through initiative
and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it
against encroachment and maintain it inviolate." Id. at ^ 27 (citations omitted).
While the Court is well aware of the importance of direct legislation in our
constitutional framework, it is equally cognizant of the fundamental principle of
majority rule. "Our system of government is premised on the notion of majority
rule with minority rights. Majority rule is the foundational premise of both of the
constitutionally mandated mechanisms of enacting legislation. Id. at ^f 60. This
principle of majority rule is inextricably linked to the mechanisms by which
people may initiate direct legislation. Under Utah law, the people's right to
legislate directly is set forth in two distinct mechanisms. First, if the people wish
to exercise their legislative power to enact a law or ordinance, they are required to
follow the requirements applicable to initiatives. [Citations omitted.] Second, if
the people wish to exercise their legislative power to suspend or repeal a law or an
ordinance, they are required to follow the requirements applicable to referenda.
[Citations omitted.] Hence, while the people's right to initiate direct legislation is
sacrosanct, the procedures for exercising that right are precise because the right of
direct legislation was not meant to frustrate majority rule but rather to carry it out.
By its own terms, the Initiative Petition at issue in this lawsuit seeks
nothing more than a re-vote on a binding fluoridation opinion question that was
already approved by a majority of Davis County voters in November, 2000,
pursuant to the mechanism set forth in Section 19-4-111 of the Utah Code
Thus, the Court finds that the Initiative Petition seeks to do precisely what the
power of referendum is reserved for - the rejection of legislation that has already
been adopted. To allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot would
effectively render the referenda provisions in the Utah Constitution and the Utah
Code meaningless and allow the petition sponsors to subvert the important time
requirements established by the State Legislature for referenda. . . . As a result,
10

the Court finds that the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative
Petition to be placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law
governing initiatives and referenda.
. . . [T]he Court also finds that plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction
enjoining the defendant Clerk from placing the Initiative Petition on the upcoming
general election ballot. . . . Allowing the Initiative Petition to be placed on the
ballot would subvert the efforts of plaintiff s members and Davis County voters by
allowing the petition sponsors to misuse the people's direct legislative power to
thwart the will of a majority of Davis County voters. . . . If the Court allowed the
Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot, the lawful vote of a majority of Davis
County residents would be nullified by a local initiative that this Court has deemed
unlawful and untimely.
The Court alsofindsthat issuing a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff
would not be adverse to the public interest. While the Court recognizes and
respects the people's right to initiate direct legislation, the public, and Davis
County voters in particular, have a real and substantial interest in ensuring that the
laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed and the election process
adheres to the rule of law. Because of the important and unique issues involved in
this lawsuit, the Courtfindsthat the public interest is advanced by issuing the
injunction.
R. at 280-85, passim, (Addendum Tab 1.)
Having prevailed on all the issues in the case in chief, Plaintiff filed its Motion for
Attorneys' Fees on November 7, 2002, requesting an award of fees in the amount of
$45,034.15 under the private attorney general doctrine enunciated by this Court in
Stewart. (R. at 296-305.) (Addendum Tabs 14, 15.)
Defendants did not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of fees sought, but
opposed the motion, asserting that Stewart did not apply because no common fund had
been created and any award of fees would be punitive in nature against the Defendant.
Following an evidentiary hearing on August 7, 2003, the court denied the Motion for
Attorneys' Fees in its written order on October 3, 2003. (R. at 852.) (Addendum Tab 2.)
li

Plaintiff appealed the denial of its attorneys' fees. On appeal, the defendant Clerk
was not defended by the Davis County Attorney's Office. Rather, the County hired - at
taxpayer expense — outside, private counsel to write its brief and present its oral
argument.
The Court of Appeals issued its order on August 11, 2005, holding that the district
court'sfindingswere inadequate to allow the appellate court to determine whether the
district court had abused its discretion, and remanded to the district court, ordering it to
make additional findings. (R. at 877.) (Addendum Tab 3.)
On remand, the district court conducted no further proceedings, but issued a
revised Memorandum Decision and Order on February 17, 2006, again denying Plaintiffs
attorneys' fees. (R. at 899.) (Addendum Tab 4.)
On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff appealed - for the second time ~ the denial of its
Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Once again in this second appeal, as in the first appeal, the
Defendant Davis County Clerk is not defended by the Davis County Attorney's Office.
Rather, once again, the County has retained a private lawfirm— at taxpayer expense — to
write its brief and likely also to represent the County in oral argument before this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court denied Plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees and costs because it
held that the Plaintiff failed to show that: (A) the County officials acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons; (B) the litigation resulted in a monetary
award [a common fund] out of which its attorneys' fees could be paid; or (C) the
12

litigation bestowed a substantial pecuniary or nonpecuniary benefit. None of these
requirements, however, is part of the Stewart test as enunciated by this Court. Nor is any
of these requirements consistent with the underlying goals of the private attorney general
doctrine. As such, the district court's imposition of these requirements constituted legal
error, which must be reviewed by this Court de novo.
The district court not only applied an incorrect legal standard in denying Plaintiffs
attorneys' fees, but it further abused its discretion when it ignored the elements of the
private attorney general doctrine as articulated in Stewart. Those elements require that
Plaintiff undertake a legal challenge when no one else will do so, that Plaintiff prevail —
thereby "vindicating a strong or societally important public policy" — and that the
necessary costs of doing so transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an
extent requiring subsidization. All of these elements were met in the litigation below.
On the merits of the case in chief, the district court concluded, among other things,
that Plaintiffs successful challenge of an illegal "petition" had raised important public
issues of first impression, protected the rule of law and the integrity of balloting and
election processes, and defended the "sacrosanct and fundamental right" of citizens to
directly legislate through initiatives and referenda. When these same findings and
conclusions were cited by Plaintiff in its subsequent for attorneys' fees under the private
attorney general doctrine, however, the district court ignored and negated them.
Suddenly and inexplicably, the district court could nowfindno merit whatsoever nor
anything of value in the Plaintiffs litigation. But the district court's findings and
13

conclusions on the merits of the underlying litigation were still binding; indeed, they had
been repeatedly incorporated by reference in all subsequent orders denying attorneys'
fees, and the district court abused its discretion in negating and ignoring them.
Affirming the district court's order denying Plaintiffs attorneys' fees will work an
unfair and unconscionable outcome. Through four years of litigation and two separate
appeals, the County attorneys and the private law firms retained by the County have been
paid to defend an illegal petition. Yet the district court would deny the citizens of Davis
County anyrightto compensate the attorneys who challenged the County's illegal actions
and prevailed.
Finally, if the district court's order denying Plaintiffs legal fees is affirmed, the
practical result will be that fewer attorneys will be likely to challenge illegal government
conduct when no one is left to do so but private citizens or volunteer groups. In such
cases, as here, that would mean that fewer attorneys would be left to advocate for or
protect important public policies and civil rights which, by their very nature, do not result
in the recovery of large monetary awards. If that is the outcome of this appeal, our State,
the Bar, and our entire citizenry will be poorer for it.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF'S PETITION
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL DOCTRINE, RULING THAT THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT
APPLY UNLESS A PLAINTIFF CAN SHOW (A) CREATION OF A
SUBSTANTIAL PECUNIARY OR NONPECUNIARY BENEFIT; OR (B)
THE ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS ARE UNDERTAKEN IN
BAD FAITH OR SHOW BIAS.
14

Here is the issue: When private citizens successfully vindicate important
constitutional and statutory rights in behalf of the public at large, who should bear the
burden of the citizens' attorneys' fees? More particularly, where the taxpayers' resources
are used to wholly fund the defense of an unconstitutional or unlawful action, is it
equitable and just that the citizens willing to go up against the government bear the
financial burden themselves where a court rules that the government erred?
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Stewart v. Utah Public Service
Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted) that:
The general rule in Utah, and the traditional American rule, subject to certain
exceptions, is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a
statute or contract authorizes such an award. . . . However, in the absence of a
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of
justice and equity.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court addresses each of the several equitable
bases it purported to find in the Stewart opinion and, one by one, rejects each as
inapplicable to Plaintiffs situation. First, it finds that attorneys' fees may be awarded on
an equitable basis when "a party acts 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons," but it finds no evidence of such behavior here, and holds that
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys' fees on this basis. (R. at 900-903.) Next, it cites the
"common fund" theory which Stewart recognizes is common in class action cases when
nonparty class members are financially benefited as a result of the efforts of a few
litigants who successfully create a fund that benefits the entire class. The district court
finds, however, that "in the instant case, of course, there was no monetary award and no
15

'fund' was created by Plaintiff," and therefore, the district court also cannot award fees
on this basis (R. at 903).
Next, the district court addresses the "substantial benefit" theory, and concludes
that there were neither substantial pecuniary or nonpecuniary benefits in the instant case
to justify a fee award (R. at 904-6). It then turns to the "violation of trust" basis upon
which court have used their equitable powers to grant attorneys' fees when a beneficiary
sues a trust and obtains recovery for all beneficiaries. But the district court concludes
that this case is "not of this nature," (R. at 906) and that this basis does not apply.
Finally, the district court turns to the only basis on which Plaintiff had moved for
an award of attorneys' fees - the private attorney general doctrine articulated by this
Court in Stewart. The essential facts of Stewart are strikingly similar to the instant case:
(A the public agencies charged to regulate utilities all signed off on an unlawful rate plan;
(B) private citizens were the only ones left to challenge the unlawful plan; (C) "but for"
the ratepayers' successful litigation and appeal, the unlawful scheme would have
remained in place; and (D) the private ratepayers thus successfully vindicated an
important public policy.
Yet here, the district court erred as a matter of law by misinterpreting the legal
standards set out in Stewart for an award of attorneys' fees to private plaintiffs under the
private attorney general doctrine. Having ultimately held that Plaintiff had not qualified
for a fee award under any other exception to the general rule, the court then held that the
private attorney general exception should not apply because Plaintiff had not satisfied
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any of the other exceptions; and therefore, the instant case was not "extraordinary" as
contemplated in Stewart's Footnote 19. (R. at 906-9.)
A. In Stewart, The Government Officers All Joined To Support An Unlawful
Rate Plan.
In 1990, U.S. West proposed an incentive rate regulation plan in which
shareholders and ratepayers would share company profits in excess of a specified rate of
return on equity. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 762. U.S. West, the Division of Public Utilities,
and the Committee of Consumer Services then presented the Public Service Commission
with a stipulation agreeing to the U.S. West incentive plan. The Commission made
certain findings as a prelude to rejecting the stipulation, but then adopted a rate incentive
plan of its own without a hearing or argument. Id. at 763-766. A group of private
residential ratepayers appealed the Commission's Order and challenged the lawfulness of
the rate of return U.S. West had been granted. As Justice Stewart noted:
In this proceeding, the Commission and the Division of Public Utilities
have aligned themselves with U.S. West. The Committee of Consumer Services
intervened in the proceedings before the Commission, but has taken no position on
this appeal and has not appeared as a party."
Id. at 762.
In Stewart, the regulated utility, the Commission, the Division, and the Committee
all agreed with an incentive rate plan which only the residential customers argued was
unlawful and unconstitutional. When the customers appealed to the Utah Supreme Court,
the utility, the Commission, and the Division all appeared against the customers as
opposing parties, and the one state entity specifically charged by statute to represent the
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interests of residential and small business customers (the Committee of Consumer
Services) made no appearance and took no position. The customers were entirely on
their own, and in the end they prevailed on the merits. This Court held that the rate plan
was illegal, and it applied the private attorney general doctrine to award the Stewart
plaintiffs their attorneys' fees:
Courts also have awarded attorney fees to a party as a "private attorney
general" when the "vindication of a strong or societally important public policy"
takes place and the necessary costs in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization [citing Serrano v. Priest
569P.2d 1303, 1314(Cal. 1977)].
In the alternative, if no [common]fund is created, we find that the private
attorney general exception to the American rule is applicable to this case and
that [U. S. West] should be ordered to pay those fees.
As set out throughout this opinion, plaintiffs have successfully vindicated
an important public policy benefitting all of the ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs,
a handful of ratepayers acting entirely on their own, took on [U.S. West], the
Public Service Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities and have
succeeded in having the Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful, section
54-4-4.1(2) declared unconstitutional, and the Commission's "incentive" plan held
invalid. It is significant that the Committee of Consumer Services, which by
statute is charged with the responsibility of representing consumer interests, made
no appearance at all on this appeal and that the Commission and the Division of
Public Utilities have opposed the ratepayers on all issues.
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all [U.S.
West] ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of
whether a refund ofpast overcharges might ultimately be ordered.. Here, [U.S.
West has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful.. Butfor the
plaintiffs9 action, all that would have been unchallenged.. In the absence of a
common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney
fees.
Stewart. 885 P.2d at 783 [emphasis added].
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B. Like The Government Officials In Stewart, The Davis County
Government Officers All Joined To Place An Unlawful Revote Petition On
The Ballot, Leaving No One To Defend The Rights Of The Majority Of
Voters.
In the instant case, 44,403 Davis County voters, a 52% majority in the November
7,2000 general election, enacted waterfluoridationas the law in Davis County pursuant
to a resolution placed on the general election ballot by the County Commission under
authority granted in Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-11 l(l)(c). That 2000fluoridationvote of the
people was the very kind of direct legislative power this Court addressed in Gallivan v.
Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002): "The power of the legislature and the power of
the people to legislate directly through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive,
and concurrent and share 'equal dignity/" The process of implementing that 2000
general election vote onfluoridationtook three years to fully accomplish.
The opponents offluoridationwho wanted a re-do of the 2000 election included
not only the sponsors of the unlawful initiative petition, but also certain key elected
officers of Davis County - even though Davis County operates no water systems (R. at
874-12). The County Clerk, the County Attorney, and the Chairman of the County
Commission all signed the anti-fluoridation initiative petition. (R. at 768; 874-64, 865.)
Their collective actions and decisions - taken for whatever reasons may have motivated
them - placed an unlawful initiative petition on the ballot and threatened the further
implementation of the Health Department's 2001 fluoridation order. 2

Of all the Davis County officials' actions in ensuring that the "petition" was placed on
the ballot, those of the Defendant Clerk are surely the most unusual. His personal
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The Clerk could not have refused to issue petition forms in May 2001, but
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-507(5)(a) [Addendum Tab 18], the Clerk had a
statutory duty to determine the legality of the petition before filing it and certifying it to

opposition to fluoridation (R. at 874-51) preceded the 2000 general election, and most
curiously manifested itself by his repeated injection of himself and his public office into
efforts to defeat the fluoridation ballot question — even though Davis County operates no
water systems (R. at 874-12), has no jurisdiction over their management (except for the
Health Department's duty to monitor water quality), nor does the Clerk/Auditor have
authority to audit the operations of the cities and towns (R. at 874-14). (Addendum Tab
16.) The most egregious use of the Clerk's office to tilt the 2000 fluoridation vote was
his publication of the official Voter Information Pamphlet (R. at 806, EX 2; Addendum
Tab 7), which discussed only the fluoridation ballot question, even though a companion
ballot question proposed an increase in the transit sales tax (R. at 658, EX 2; Addendum
Tab 6) which would raised the annual sales tax in Davis County by $26 per person (R. at
806, EX 7; Addendum Tab 8). The transit proposal's increased cost to taxpayers was
nearly six times higher than the annual cost estimated by Layton City to fluoridate its
water system (R. at 874-49), but the transit tax increase on the same general election
ballot didn't make it into the Clerk's Voter Information Pamphlet. The Pamphlet even
had the Clerk's own "fluoridation cost" page (R. at 874-26), which contained selected
estimates offluoridationcosts, even though such costs are not matters for which the
Defendant has any statutory responsibility. The Defendant Clerk's intense personal
desire to have a second vote on fluoridation in 2002 most egregiously manifested itself in
his August 1, 2002 letter (R. at 806, EX 11; Addendum Tab 12) to Mr. Gerald Hess, the
Clerk's official legal counsel. Although the Defendant had already certified the unlawful
petition as an "initiative petition" to the County Commission (R. at 806, EX 12;
Addendum Tab 10), he was so eager to assure its placement on the ballot that he
suggested to his own lawyer that the petition could be construed as a "timely filed
referendum" based on his discussions with his son (R. at 874-81) - after he had already
certified it as an initiative. By certifying the unvetted petition as an "initiative" under
Utah Coded Ann. § 20A-7-501(3)(d)(ii) [Addendum Tab 17], the Clerk chose a statutory
mechanism which guaranteed placement on the ballot even if the Commission took no
action on it. The Clerk could have refused to accept the signed petitions for filing,
pursuant to 20A-7-507(5)(a) [Addendum Tab 18], but that would have placed the burden
of paying the costs and legal fees required to prove the petition was lawful on its
sponsors, rather than the County. This same responsibility to vet for legality before
accepting a petition for filing also applies to referendum petitions under Utah Code Ann.
§ 20A-7-607(4) [Addendum Tab 19]. This choice of certification options by the Clerk
assured that the taxpayers would pay for the "initiative" petition's defense.
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the County Commission on July 9, 2002 as a lawful initiative (R. at 806, EX 12;
Addendum Tab 10). He made no effort to do so prior to his certification (R. at 874-64.)
When the County Attorney's office finally rendered an opinion about whether the petition
was an initiative or a referendum - at the County Commission meeting on August 6, 2002
— that opinion (that the petition was a lawful initiative) was, as held by the district court,
incorrect. As stated in the minutes, the Commission received a legal opinion from Mr.
Hess that the petition was an initiative. (R. at 806, EX 1.) (Addendum Tab 13.) Mr. Hess
took the Commissioners through the statutory options for petitions submitted as
initiatives. Mr. Hess had previously told the Clerk that he was going to advise the
Commission to take no action on the petition (R. at 874-77, 127, 128), and the
Commission followed that advice. (R. at 806, EX 1.) Chairman McConkie stated that he
felt "neutrality is in the best interests of the Commission," and he called twice for a
motion and none was given. With that decision not to act, the Commission, knowingly
and on counsel's advice, allowed the "go-to-ballot default" of §20A-7-501(3)(d)(ii) to
kick in. (Addendum Tab 17.)
As of August 6, 2002, the Davis County government was squarely behind an
unlawful petition and had placed it on the ballot, leaving only private citizens to defend
thefluoridationlaw enacted by the voters in 2000. The district court's "finding," that
there had been no showing of a "necessity for private enforcement" (R. at 908) is not
consistent with the evidence in any respect, and it defies reason to assume that those same
County officers - either the three who signed the petition or the others who supported it 21

had any interest after August 6, 2002 in defending the 2000 vote of the people against an
unlawful "initiative" petition. Whatever motives may be ascribed to these officers, the
unarguable fact is that Plaintiff was the only voice in opposition to the County officers'
decisions, no one else stepped forward to oppose the unlawful petition, and by following
the Clerk's remarkable decision to declare the petition an initiative - without ever vetting
it for legality - the Davis County government's actions allowing it to be treated as an
initiative pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A 7-501(3)(d)(ii) guaranteed that all of the
costs entailed in defending the unlawful petition would be borne by Davis County
taxpayers.
C. The Instant Case Meets AH Of The Stewart Criteria For A Fee Award
Under The Private Attorney General Doctrine.
The Plaintiff here, like those in Stewart, challenged the government officers who
are charged to protect the public interest and ballot integrity, succeeded in having the
petition declared unconstitutional and unlawful, and succeeded in barring it from the
ballot in 2002. They preserved the rule of law and the integrity of the ballot and election
process, which are public benefits essential to all the 250,000 citizens of the County.
"But for" Plaintiffs successful intervention and litigation, Davis County voters would
have had to vote in 2002 on an unlawful initiative petition which would have gone on the
ballot at a time when more than 25% of the water systems in the County had already
made the capital investment in fluoridation and the rest were in the middle of an
expensive configuration of their treatment systems to safely addfluorideto the water
supply. The uncertainty of a possible revote threatened to put several water systems in a
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real quandary about whether to comply with the County Health Department's 2001
implementation order.
In its October 15, 2002 Ruling on the merits of the case (R. at 275-87; Addendum
Tab 1), the district court held, among other things, that:
(A) the issues presented by Plaintiff are of great importance to the general public
(R. at 280); (B) the lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right
of the people to legislate directly (Id.); (C) to allow the Initiative Petition to be
placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda provisions in the Utah
Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless and allow the sponsors to subvert the
important timelines established by the Legislature for referenda (R. at 282); the
Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the
ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing initiatives and
referenda.
R. at 284.
In Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977), which is cited in Stewart,
that court wrote:
In spite of variations in emphasis, all of these formulations [of the private
attorney general doctrine] seem to suggest that there are three basic factors to be
considered in awarding fees on this theory. These are in general: (1) the strength
or societal importance of the public policy being vindicated by the litigation, (2)
the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff, (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision.
If the people's right to legislate directly is a sacrosanctfiindamentalright, then surely the
defense of what has been directly legislated and the preservation of ballot integrity
against unlawful manipulation constitutes the vindication of a strong and societally
important public policy.3

In Footnote 2 of the district court's Memorandum Decision, Judge Dawson wrote, "I
concede it may be best for the state legislature to determine which public policies are of
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After describing the results achieved by the plaintiffs who challenged U.S. West
and the state regulatory agencies, this Court wrote in Stewart: "But for plaintiffs' action,
all that would have been unchallenged and none of [U.S. West's] ratepayers would have
had any relief." (Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783.) The "but for" standard was a principal factor
in the Court's decision to deny attorney fees in Shipman v. Evans, 100 P.3d 1151, 1155
(Utah 2004). In that case, the plaintiffs had not achieved success through any of thenjudicial claims (all had been dismissed and injunctive relief had been denied), and had
not conferred a public benefit through a judicial action. This Court distinguished the
Shipman request for fees from Stewart on that basis.
The district court's conclusion in the Memorandum Decision that, "There was no
showing by Plaintiff during the evidentiary hearing of the necessity for private
enforcement [essentially the Shipman "but for" issue] nor of the magnitude of the
resultant burden on the plaintiff (R. at 908) is not supported by the record. As of the
August 6, 2002 County Commission meeting, the unlawful petition was undeniably
headed for the November ballot automatically by operation of law -pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 20A-7-501(3)(d)(ii). (R. at 806, EX 1; R. at 874-156; Addendum Tab

sufficient importance to warrant an award of attorney fees." With respect, Plaintiff
submits that the private attorney general doctrine is a rule of the court which goes to the
inherent, equitable powers of courts, and as such, Judge Dawson is proposing an
incursion of the legislative branch of government into the province of the judiciary,
which, while it might provide the clarity he seeks, could also establish a regrettable and
dubious precedent by undermining the separation of powers prescribed in the Utah
Constitution. (R. at 908.)
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17.) "But for" Plaintiffs intervention, there most certainly would have been a
countywide vote on an unlawful initiative petition.
The district court also held in its Memorandum Decision that Plaintiff was under
an obligation to show an inability "to pay attorneys' fees without assistance." (R. at 908.)
This reading of Stewart, however, is strained and baldly wrong. The correct legal
standard provides that the necessary cost of the litigation "transcend the individual
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Stewart, 885 P.2d at
783 [citing Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)]. This standard is
completely different than the district court's requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate their
inability to pay attorneys' fees without assistance. Indeed, almost all public interest
litigation will cost more than the pecuniary interest at stake for any individual plaintiff.
This is self-evident in litigation where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to vindicate important
constitutional and statutory rights - which by their very nature do not produce any pot of
money or entail a "pecuniary interest" for the litigants.
Litigation to protect individual rights and civil liberties — freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, the right to assemble, or the right to trial, indeed almost all our
individual liberties - will always, by definition, exceed any "pecuniary interest" of the
individual litigants because the vindication of such intangible rights will almost never
generate any monetary or involve a personal pecuniary interest at all. Does this mean
that the vindication of such rights and liberties is less important than, say, utility rate
setting? Certainly not. It could be persuasively argued that the most important values
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and rights in our society are intangible and that their defense will rarely generate any
financial reward for those who benefit from their vindication. Here, the district court was
folly apprised of the grassroots, citizen-volunteer composition of Utahns for Better
Dental Health-Davis, Inc. which was disclosed and argued as a consequence of Davis
County's challenge to Plaintiff s standing. (R. at 102-04). The district court noted in its
2002 ruling on the merits that Plaintiff was formed by citizen members of the Davis
County Board of Health, including five former chairpersons. (R. at 279.)
Moreover, neither Stewart nor any of its progeny has ever required that plaintiffs
demonstrate an inability to pay in order to be granted a fee award under the private
attorney general doctrine. The fees originally sought in this matter totaled $45,034.15 (R.
at 310). It is difficult to formulate what Plaintiff could have presented as evidence which
would sufficiently prove a negative in terms of "ability to pay" the $45,034 sought at that
early stage of these proceedings, let alone the fees which have been incurred since. If it
is not inherently obvious that a group of volunteer citizens, such as Plaintiff, requires
subsidization, would they have to present their individual financial statements as a
measure of a collective inability to pay the costs of litigation? Would they have to show
that their borrowing power was exhausted? Or that their mortgages exceed the value of
their homes? Would similar disclosures be required of their attorneys?
Even though Plaintiff stood to recover no financial gain by prevailing in the
litigation below, the district court further denigrated Plaintiffs successful litigation by
writing that:
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While Plaintiff asserts that its efforts vindicated the rights of the voters,
their efforts can just as easily be viewed as supporting and protecting Plaintiffs
personal views regarding the benefit of fluoridation. This entity was organized
specifically to advocate the benefits of fluoridation in Davis County and to
promote the acceptance of water fluoridation. They most certainly furthered their
cause by obtaining a ruling that effectively frustrated opponents of fluoridation
from obtaining a re-vote on this issue in 2002. Further, an argument can be easily
made that only 52% of the voters in Davis County benefited from the Court's
interpretation in this action leaving the other 48% disenfranchised in their view.
Doctrines of fairness and equity do not suggest that all citizens of Davis County,
citizens almost evenly divided on the merits of a polarizing issue, should have to
pay the attorney fees for the pro-fluoride advocates.
R. at 905-6.
This conclusion by the district court is gratuitous and arbitrary. First, it is an
absurdity for the district court to assert that "48% of the voters were disenfranchised" by
the court's decision enjoining the illegal petition from placement on the 2002 general
election ballot. No one was "disenfranchised" by that decision, because that 48% of
voters actually cast their votes (albeit on the losing side) in the 2000 general election.
The district court argues against its own decision by implying that a "disenfranshisement"
occurs when an unlawful petition is barred from the ballot.
Moreover, the district court argues that awarding Plaintiff its legal fees would
inequitably burden all the citizens of Davis County who oppose fluoridation - when, in
fact, all of the citizens of Davis County (including the 52% majority who voted for
fluoridation) - were (and still are) burdened with all of the costs and attorneys' fees
expended by Davis County to defend the unlawful petition! The Memorandum Decision
mistakes the nature of what was at issue in the original litigation: the issue in the case
below was not the merits of fluoridation, but whether opponents of fluoridation, including
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the county officers, were bound to follow the rule of law in pressing their opposition.
Plaintiff submits, respectfully, that the instant case is extraordinary and deserving of an
award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine, not because it
involved fluoridation as a public policy, but because the lawful decision of the voters
respecting that policy was challenged in an unlawful and manipulative manner which
trampled the rule of law and pitted the private citizens against the county government.
In the Memorandum Decision, the district court wrote that in weighing whether
the decision for Plaintiff constituted a "vindication of a strong or societally important
public policy," the fact that the Plaintiff "accomplished personal interests by pursuing the
matter disinclines the Court from finding that this factor has been met." (R, at 908.) As a
matter of law, this reasoning is not an appropriate consideration under Stewart when
considering a fee award under the private attorney general doctrine. Obviously, the
ratepayer plaintiffs in Stewart had a similar personal interest in lower utility rates.
Indeed, if a public interest plaintiff does not have a personal or philosophical policy
interest in the litigation it initiates, it's hard to fathom why such a plaintiff would ever
litigate.
It should also be noted that the private attorney general doctrine was relied upon
by the Serrano court as a means of compensating successful public interest litigation of
precisely the nature of the instant case:
In the complex society in which we live it frequently occurs that citizens in
great numbers and across a broad spectrum have interests in common. These,
while of enormous significance to the society as a whole, do not involve the
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fortunes of a single individual to the extent necessary to encourage their
vindication in the courts.
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1313.
Members of the Bar, to their credit, undertake a great deal of pro bono
representation. If the private attorney general doctrine cannot justify an award of
attorneys' fees to citizens who defend significant public interests such as voting rights,
the integrity of election results, and even the rule of law - where public officials either
act improperly or decline to act at all — then Utah lawyers need to know that as a guide to
their future business practices. If these kinds of public interest, public policy cases are to
be uncompensated, then there will be little incentive for most Utah lawyers, who are
neither independently wealthy nor supported by vast resources, to invest in the arduous
commitment to public interest advocacy. In this case, the original litigation was
concluded in six weeks. The dispute over attorneys' fees is now in its fourth year and on
its second trip to an appellate court; and still, all of the legal fees and costs of the antifluoride minority, who lost twice at the ballot box and who lost in the original litigation
over the unlawful petition, are being paid by all of the taxpayers of Davis County.
D. The District Court Erred By Requiring A Substantial Monetary Benefit.
A principal reason cited in the district court's Memorandum Decision denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees was that, in the instant case, no monetary benefit
accrued to the residents of Davis County because of the lawsuit undertaken by Plaintiff.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court concluded that fees should not be
awarded to Plaintiff because in Stewart, " . . . the Supreme Court noted the exceptional

nature of the case and focused on the substantial monetary benefits conferred on all
ratepayers by plaintiffs' actions and the windfall obtained by respondent USWC." (R. at
907.) How central that erroneous monetary consideration was to the district court's
decision to deny fees is highlighted in these comments by the district court in argument:
THE COURT: Of course, in Stewart there were financial benefits that were
given. There are nofinancialbenefits here that have been testified to.
R. at 874-205.
THE COURT: Oh, I agree, the Supreme Court recognizes that there's this
Attorney General Exception if there's a vindication of important public policy,
public right. But then in the application of that rule in this specific case, it was
financial benefit that it seems to me was the most persuasive element.
R. at 874-207.
With respect, Plaintiff submits that the district court incorrectly equated
"societally important public policy" with monetary benefit, which is not a standard of law
Stewart imposed. There are a host of "societally important" public policies, beginning
with the Bill of Rights, which, when government violates them, do not involve monetary
benefits or losses. The right to vote is a fundamental right to which no price tag is
attached. The right of the people to directly legislate, according to Gallivan v. Walker,
54 P.3d 1069,1081 (Utah 2002) "is sacrosanct and a fundamental right." However, that
sacrosanct right doesn't involve money.
The Stewart award of fees wasn't based on the fact that the successful plaintiffs
put money (from a common fund or otherwise) in the pockets of ratepayers, although a
financial benefit to customers was one consequence of the ruling. The critical language
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is the few sentences where this Court directed the Public Service Commission to require
U.S. West's shareholders to pay the legal fees even if no money for refunds was to be had
from a common fund:
. . . if no such fund [accumulated overcharges] is created.. .Here, [U.S.
West] has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was
authorized by the Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order...
In the absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is
appropriate to require the shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of
plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees.
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 (Emphasis added).
Further, the district court incorrectly grafted yet another inappropriate requirement
onto the private attorney general doctrine: creation of a monetary windfall to the
defendant. At R. 909, the district court sets out its conclusions as to why the instant case
doesn't merit a fee award, and writes. "[This case] is not the extraordinary type of case
envisioned by Stewart. First of all, there were no monetary benefits created by plaintiffs
actions as in Stewart nor was there a windfall to Defendant." (Emphasis added.) Under
the district court's perception of the doctrine, not only does a plaintiff have to create a
monetary benefit for Davis County voters, there must also be a monetary windfall to the
County as a result of the unlawful conduct found by the court.
The "societally important public policy" the Stewart plaintiffs vindicated was not
a rate refund - indeed, the court was not sure there would even be one - it was the
challenge to an unconstitutional incentive rate plan: the plan was an assault on the
Constitution and statutes, irrespective of whether it raised or lowered rates.
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The district court's conclusion that it "is not inclined to conclude that the mere
interpretation of a contested petition involves 'vindication of a strong or societally
important public policy'" (R. at 908) is an arbitrary abuse of discretion. The
Memorandum Decision, for the second time, places lower utility rates as a higher societal
good than the rule of law, voting rights, and ballot integrity. This was not a trivial
election technicality of mere ho-hum scope. In 2004, more than 51,000 voters - a
majority of those voting - once again validated their policy decision from 2000 that water
systems in Davis County be fluoridated. This Court has stated that the people's right to
directly legislate through initiative and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right. .
[and] Utah courts must defend it against encroachment and maintain it inviolate."
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Utah 2002). Defense of that sacrosanct right
against unlawful manipulation is among the highest duty of courts - and it is hardly
appropriate for a district judge to pass it off as a "mere interpretation of a contested
petition."
E. The District Court Erred In Requiring A Showing of Bad Faith As A
Requirement For An Award of Attorneys' Fees.
In the Memorandum Decision, while the district court somewhat modified its
position regarding "bad faith" as a prerequisite for allowing fees under the private
attorney general doctrine, it nevertheless makes findings and conclusions ("the Court
finds that Defendant did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons .." (R. at 901)), which suggest that "bad faith" is still deemed to be an element of
such awards. That is clearly the import of the district court's conclusion:
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Also, the magnitude and history of the abdication of duties by the Public
Service Commission found in Stewart are lacking in this case. As the Court has
previously found, the Davis County Clerk performed his duties in good faith
following the advice of legal counsel. This is far different from the Stewart
findings of a history of extraordinary abdication by the Commission of its
statutory duties for a number of years.
R. at 909.
The district court is still attempting to graft a "bad faith" legal standard onto the
Stewart private attorney general decision, for which there is no basis in law. There was
nofindingin Stewart that the Public Service Commission was guilty of bad faith when it
adopted an unconstitutional incentive rate plan - it was just mistaken. Exactly as the
Defendants claim here for themselves, the Commission and the Division and the
Committee in Stewart were all advised by their legal counsel and presumably followed
that advice. In this Court's view, the state regulators got the law wrong, and "good
intentions" or "following the advice of counsel" did not excuse adoption of an unlawful
rate plan or preclude an award of attorneys' fees to the citizens who successfully
challenged the unlawful plan.
No specific findings or detailed evidentiary analysis support the district court's
conclusions regarding bad faith. Therefore, the facts of the long and unusual history
leading up to the complaint in this case are unrefuted and admitted, and may be taken as
historical facts, irrespective of the court's impressions as to motive. The district court,
for example, simply did not deal with the unrebutted fact that the Defendant Clerk had
acted outside the scope of his statutorily restricted duties in the events leading up to the
2000 general election. Nor did the district court note the highly irregular proposal made
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by the Defendant Clerk in his August 1, 2002 letter to re-certify - after the fact - the
status of the petition as a referendum. Whether all such conduct was in good faith or bad
faith, as a conclusion of law, has no bearing on the status of such episodes as historical
facts, and simply as unusual facts, they collectively make the instant case extraordinary.
The district court's addition of a "bad faith" requirement to the Stewart decision,
as a legal standard for defining the "exceptional" or "extraordinary" result of a case, was
an error of law and an abuse of discretion.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL DOCTRINE BY IGNORING AND NEGATING ITS
OWN PREVIOUS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE
MERITS OF THE CASE WHICH STILL BOUND THE COURT.

When the district court ruled in 2002 in favor of Plaintiff on the merits, its findings
and conclusions were weighty regarding the public significance of the matters before it
for decision. The district court found that the "issues presented by plaintiff are of great
public importance to the general public, Davis County voters and cities within Davis
County who must implement fluoridation," and that "this lawsuit raises important and
unique issues concerning the right of the people to legislate directly." (R. at 280.) The
district court concluded that "to allow the [illegal] petition to be placed on the ballot
would effectively render the referenda provision in the Utah Constitution and the Utah
Code meaningless," (R. at 282) and "would subvert the efforts of. .. Davis County
voters by allowing the petition sponsors to misuse the people's direct legislative power to
thwart the will of a majority of Davis County voters," (R. at 284.) The trial judge held
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that "the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the
ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law governing initiatives and referenda"
(R. at 284), and that "the public and Davis County voters in particular, have a real and
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously
followed and the election process adheres to the rule of law." (R. at 285.) Finally, the
district court concludes: "Because of the important and unique issues involved in this
lawsuit, the Court finds that the public interest is advanced by issuing an injunction."
(R. at 285.)
These findings of fact and conclusions of law were never appealed or challenged
by Defendant. The judge'sfindingsand conclusions from the 2002 Ruling on the case in
chief were never withdrawn, amended or modified. To the contrary, the judge repeatedly
incorporated them by reference in later orders, including his two orders denying
attorneys' fees to Plaintiff. These findings and conclusions on the merits are the law of
the case and are still part of the record, and they still bind the district court and the
litigants.
Yet when the district court was asked, on the basis of thesefindingsand
conclusions, to grant Plaintiff its attorneys' fees based upon its vindication of a strong
and societally important public policy, the district court - suddenly and inexplicably could find no value whatsoever in the underlying litigation, stating: "This Court cannot
even find actual or concrete benefits created in this case," (R. at 909), and commenting
that the service provided by Plaintiff to the voters of Davis County "is, at best,... absent
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of actual and concrete benefits, and therefore undeserving of equitable consideration."
(R. at 905.) Gone is any reference to the "important and unique issues" raised in
Plaintiffs lawsuit. Gone also is any concern to protect majority rule, the rule of law, or
the "sacrosanct and fundamental right" of the people to legislate directly through
initiative and referendum which "Utah Courts must defend against encroachment and
maintain inviolate."
Ignoring and abandoning its own earlier findings and conclusions on the merits,
the district court now states in its Order denying attorneys' fees, "While the Court
recognizes that the people's right to directly legislate through initiative and referendum
is an important andfundamental right, this Court is not inclined to conclude that the
mere interpretation of a contested petition involves 'vindication of a strong or societally
important public policy.'" (R. at 908; emphasis added.)
Although the language has changed slightly, the district court's ruling is an echo
of the district court's first order denying fees in October 2003 which found that "even
though voting rights are a significant issue in the context of this case, such significance
does not rise to the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission . ." (Order of October 3, 2003, Finding of Fact No. 7, R. at 854.) Or
even earlier, conferring on the fee issue with the district court on August 8, 2003:
THE COURT: While I find that voting rights are significant, I can't find in
this case that it's the type of case envisioned by the Supreme Court in their
Stewart decision. But Footnote 19 in the Stewart decision gave guidance that
attorneys' fees should only be granted in extraordinary cases. In my view,
although this is a unique case, it's not an extraordinary case.
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R. at 875-7.
The district court incorporated all of its October 15, 2002 Ruling on the merits into its
later Memorandum Decision denying fees. That earlier, highly laudatory language
describing the societally significant importance of the Plaintiffs litigation victory, which
was not withdrawn or modified or even distinguished by the district court, cannot be
squared with the district court's subsequent wholesale discounting of Plaintiff s litigation
as a justification to deny Plaintiff any attorneys' fees.
The district court's unexplained, quantum leap from the laudatory findings and
conclusions of 2002 to its constricted conclusions in the Memorandum Decision, with no
reconciliation of the cumulativefindingsof important public policy in 2002 to the stark
"mere interpretation of a contested petition" language in 2006, is unreasoned,
unexplained, and utterly arbitrary.
Moreover, it is hard to square the district court's dismissive nod to voting rights
and ballot integrity as a "mere interpretation of a contested petition" with the Utah
Supreme Court's soaring pronouncement in Gallivan that those same voting rights
associated with direct legislation are "sacrosanct and must be maintained inviolate."
(Gallivan. 54 P. 3d at 1081.) The district court even noted that the initiative and
referendum process is "an important and fundamental right." Respectfully, there cannot
be any substantial difference between "important and fundamental rights" and the
vindication of a "strong or societally important public policy." The district court's
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attempted distinction - as a basis for denying fees - is arbitrary, unreasonable, and an
abuse of discretion.
As previously noted, the district court, in the Memorandum Decision, continued to
intermingle all of the various equitable rationales for attorney fee awards as a basis for
concluding that this instant case does not merit a fee award under the private attorney
general doctrine. One such shoe-horned analysis warrants additional discussion. The
Memorandum Decision discuses the "substantial benefit" theory and its application to the
private attorney general doctrine - first by concluding, "In this Court's view this service
to the citizens is, at best, akin to the service provided by the plaintiffs in Serrano, absent
of concrete and actual benefits, and therefore undeserving of equitable consideration." (R.
at 905.)
The district court argues that Serrano dictates a denial of fees based upon this
same "substantial benefit" rationale, but it fails to note that the court in Serrano in fact
awarded attorneys 'fees under a different equitable theory - the private attorney general
doctrine, which was based on vindication of an important public policy - separate and
apart from conferring a substantial benefit. Even if the district court was correct about
the "substantial benefit" theory being a component of the private attorney general
doctrine - which it was not - its conclusion that a vindication of voting rights is not a
substantial benefit is also incorrect as a matter of law.
The Utah Court of Appeals amplified the substantial benefit theory in Levanger v.
Highland Estates Properties. 80 P.3d 569, 576 (Utah App. 2003). While Levanger
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involved a derivative action under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court cited to Stewart as the basis for a "substantial benefit" award of fees where
individual members of a homeowners' association sued on a complaint that the
association had improperly amended the association's covenants, conditions and
restrictions, and that the use of mail-in ballots was improper. The Court awarded
attorneys' fees of $41,325.15, and stated:
We agree with the holdings of these cases and conclude that a nonmonetary benefit, including the promotion and vindication of shareholders' voting
rights, can be a substantial benefit in the context of a derivative action.. We also
agree with the trial court's observation that it would be inappropriate to attempt to
offset the non-monetary benefit conferred upon Highland Estates against the
Levangers' attorney fees .. if courts were to engage in this process, it would
discourage derivative plaintiffs from bringing actions to confer a substantial nonmonetary benefit upon a corporation or association because of the possibility that
they would be required to bear the burden of all or part of the attorney fees
incurred in bringing the action.
Levanger, 80 P.3d at 576.
If, as a matter of equity, a fee award under the substantial benefit theory is
appropriate where private shareholders successfully vindicate the charter and voting
rights of a relatively small homeowner association, the equities cannot be less compelling
where private citizens successfully vindicate constitutional and statutory voting rights of
the public at large in a county of 250,000 people, 15 cities, and 18 water systems. Not to
award attorneys'fees creates exactly the same discouragement from bringing such
actions which the Court wisely decried in Levanger. The district court's conclusion that,
even under the private attorney general doctrine, "this Court cannot evenfindactual or
concrete benefits created in this case" (R. at 909) is incorrect as a matter of law and is an
39

abuse of discretion. The Utah Court of Appeals has already held that voting rights are a
substantial benefit.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court denying
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees should be reversed. Since the Defendants have not
contested the reasonableness of the fee award requested by Plaintiff, this Court should
declare that the Plaintiff has made a sufficient claim for attorneys' fees under the private
attorney general doctrine.
This is the first case to be considered by this Court which factually and legally
meets the Stewart criteria for an award of fees under the private attorney general doctrine.
The signal which this decision will send to the Utah Bar is very significant: for if this
plaintiff cannot recover legal fees under the facts and law of this case, the policy, very
clearly, will be understood to mean that government officers can interpret the law in
whatever manner and for whatever self-serving reason they wish; they may perform
illegal acts, and unless private citizens who would contest an unlawful decision or action
can fully fund any ensuing litigation, the full resources of the government, including tax
revenues, can be used to promote and defend the illegality. And, even if private citizens
prevail in their challenge, they (or their lawyers) must fully finance that victorious
litigation. If there is not even the reasonable possibility of citizen plaintiffs being
compensated for their legal fees in these circumstances, far fewer attorneys will be
willing to undertake public interest representation.
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If this Court decides in Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiff also requests that it be awarded
its attorneys' fees and costs incurred with respect to this second, as well as its first appeal.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2006.
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